QNSI

The complete platform

One security infrastructure layer. Every capability you need to operate post-quantum.

Each area below has a public evaluation page covering the buyer outcome, source-backed capability, operating workflow, integrations, maturity, and exact evidence boundary.

18Production services
87PQC algorithms
11Cloud connector families
8HSM connector implementations
6SDK languages

Cryptographic Discovery & Inventory

Find cryptographic dependencies across cloud infrastructure, hosts, TLS endpoints, certificates, secret managers, Kubernetes, repositories, and imported inventories.

Source-backed · deployment evidence required

Review capability →

Post-Quantum Key Management & Custody

Govern key creation, rotation, signing, verification, wrapping, import, policy, and qualified customer-managed custody from one tenant-scoped control surface.

Source-backed · qualified paths identified

Review capability →

Quantum-Safe Secrets Management

Manage secret versions, rotation, dynamic credentials, leakage findings, access policy, and audit context behind a consistent tenant boundary.

Source-backed · end-to-end envelope path not verified

Review capability →

Encrypted Storage & Search

Combine governed object storage, retention and replication controls with full-text and vector-search contracts designed for confidential data workflows.

Source-backed · cryptographic execution boundary not verified

Review capability →

Identity, Access & Workload Trust

Apply tenant-scoped identity, authentication, entitlement, policy-decision, quota, JIT access, simulation, federation, and workload-identity controls.

Source-backed · deployment effectiveness not verified

Review capability →

AI Security & Confidential Compute

Protect model, prompt, agent, training, inference, and event-intelligence workflows with explicit identity, policy, provenance, enclave, and operator-approval boundaries.

Source-backed · production attestation not verified

Review capability →

Security Operations & Cryptographic Response

Connect cryptographic posture, findings, attack paths, certificate lifecycle, key-compromise response, SIEM delivery, webhooks, and approval-aware response workflows.

Source-backed · response execution requires evidence

Review capability →

Tamper-Evident Audit & Assurance Evidence

Preserve service events, cryptographic context, retention policy, signed checkpoints, streaming, evidence packs, and replay-oriented verification boundaries.

Source-backed · complete event coverage not verified

Review capability →

Observability, SLOs & Operational Intelligence

Bring service health, metrics, traces, logs, SLOs, anomalies, costs, security context, and deployment-specific evidence into one operational view.

Live portal surface · data depends on connected telemetry

Review capability →

Developer Platform & Secure Delivery

Integrate QNSI through first-party SDKs, REST, CLI, MCP, WebSockets, browser patterns, source scanning, code signing, and secure build-pipeline surfaces.

Published SDKs · operation support varies by service

Review capability →

Deployment, Isolation & Resilience

Define the network, tenancy, region, compute, custody, observability, continuity, and operational boundaries for QNSI Cloud or a customer-specific deployment.

Cloud live · dedicated topologies are engagement-specific

Review capability →

18 manifest-declared services. 11cloud-vendor connector families spanning 36 inventory source types. 87 PQC algorithms (24 KEMs + 63 signatures). 8 capability-gated HSM connector implementations. 6 SDK languages. Operated as one security infrastructure layer. Public SDKs and integration examples are independently verifiable at the public SDK and integration source mirror at github.com/heossihq/qnsi-public.

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Deployment topologies

Five deployment models. Five orthogonal axes. Sized to your regulatory posture.

The homepage architecture diagram renders the Cloud-default flow - the model most self-serve customers start on. Regulated buyers, sovereign-cloud operators, and air-gapped environments compose a different topology from the same underlying platform. The Cloud-default topology is live today; the VPC, private-endpoint, on-premises, and air-gapped topologies are provisioned per tenant on an enterprise engagement. Ask in any sales / security engagement for the one that matches your posture.

Default

Cloud (default)

Public internet → QNSI edge gateway → multi-tenant cloud services.

Fastest onboarding and the current public service. Shared client contracts are published, but operation availability and behavior still depend on the service, version, entitlement, and observed deployment.

Self-serve developers · SMBs · early-stage enterprise pilots · proof-of-value engagements.

Topology

VPC-peered

Private VPC peering between customer VPC and a QNSI VPC in the customer's AWS region.

Private-connectivity architecture intended to keep the application path off the public internet. Network routing and any PQC or hybrid transport claim require deployment-specific provisioning and observed evidence.

Regulated FSI · enterprises with private-network discipline · workloads under DLP / network-segmentation policy.

Topology

Private endpoint

AWS PrivateLink / Azure Private Endpoint / GCP Private Service Connect terminating QNSI services.

QNSI services reachable only via private DNS inside the customer's chosen cloud. No NAT, no public ingress, no shared edge. Best for single-cloud enterprises that have standardised on PrivateLink-class connectivity.

Single-cloud enterprise (AWS-only, Azure-only, GCP-only) · platform teams enforcing zero-public-ingress.

Topology

On-premises

QNSI services run inside the customer's datacenter, container platform, or dedicated rack.

Control plane and data plane both live in customer infrastructure. QNSI delivers signed update bundles; telemetry can be locally retained or streamed to the customer's SIEM. No outbound dependency on the QNSI cloud for steady-state operation.

High-classification government · defence · SCIF / IL5-class environments · critical-infrastructure operators.

Topology

Air-gapped

Fully disconnected - no inbound or outbound network path to the QNSI cloud at all.

Updates delivered as signed offline bundles (PQC-signed manifests + cryptographic provenance). Telemetry written to local SIEM only. Crypto policy enforcement, audit chain, and evidence packs all operate inside the air-gap.

Sovereign defence · SCIFs · classified workloads · critical national infrastructure · regulators requiring physical-network isolation.

Composable across five orthogonal axes

The deployment model above is the network-topology axis. Four additional axes - tenancy, HSM custody, region / failover, and compute class - are configured independently. Any combination is supported subject to your tier and regulatory posture.

Axis

Network topology

Shared cloudVPC peeringPrivate endpointOn-premisesAir-gapped

5 declared deployment types - independently reproducible from the public mirror.

Axis

Tenancy

Shared (default)Isolated computeIsolated storageIsolated networkFully dedicated (all three)

Three isolation knobs toggle independently per tenant.

Axis

HSM custody

BYOH via PKCS#11 (AWS CloudHSM · Azure Dedicated HSM · Thales Luna · Entrust nShield · Utimaco CryptoServer · Marvell LiquidSecurity)BYOH via REST API (HashiCorp Vault Transit · Fortanix DSM) - not PKCS#11Customer-provisioned FIPS-validated HSM - conditional on module/configuration qualificationCloudHSM 2-HSM HA · 3-HSM durability

8 connector implementations - 6 via PKCS#11 (AWS CloudHSM · Azure Dedicated HSM · Thales Luna · Entrust nShield · Utimaco CryptoServer · Marvell LiquidSecurity) and 2 via REST API (HashiCorp Vault Transit · Fortanix DSM). The generic PKCS#11 path is verified with SoftHSM, the Vault REST path is verified with a live Vault backend, and QNSI's shipped provider plus HSPK custody path are proven on AWS CloudHSM hsm2m.medium in FIPS mode. Named hardware is enabled only after per-deployment qualification. AWS CloudHSM can provide FIPS 140-3 Level 3 custody under Marvell Semiconductor, Inc.'s certificate #4703 only after the customer provisions and QNSI qualifies that service for the deployment. Native-PQC HSM and cloud-KMS products now exist; their algorithms, firmware, and validation scope vary. QNSI's current HSPK API supports ML-DSA-44/65/87 as a software signing compatibility path rooted in qualified HSM custody, while QNSI's 87-algorithm catalog is a broader software migration and interoperability surface.

Axis

Region & failover

Active / passive failover regionMulti-regionSovereign region-lockedData-residency controls

Region, failover, and residency provisioned per tenant on enterprise engagement.

Axis

Compute class

Standard CPUGPU-enabled enclave (sovereign / regulated AI)Confidential enclave (Intel SGX · AMD SEV · AWS Nitro)

Enclave capacity is an add-on; bring-your-own GPU-enclave hardware supported.

The Cloud-default topology is live today. The combinations are governed by tier and add-on entitlements; sales-assisted topologies (VPC, on-premises, air-gapped, sovereign, isolated tenancy, CloudHSM-managed clusters) are provisioned per tenant on a procurement engagement. Talk to sales for the right mix.

Talk to sales about your topologySee tiers and add-ons

Reference architectures

Five deployment patterns, each with its qualification boundary

The public cloud service and enterprise-provisioned topologies are deliberately separated. Source presence does not make a private, on-premises, or disconnected deployment generally available.

Public cloud service

QNSI Cloud

Customer workloads reach the QNSI edge through the public service boundary.

Qualification boundary: Operation availability still depends on service version, tenant policy, entitlement, provider, and observed evidence.

Provisioned per tenant

VPC-peered

Private routing joins a customer VPC to a tenant-scoped QNSI deployment boundary.

Qualification boundary: Routing, region, tenancy isolation, transport, failover, telemetry, and evidence are qualified for the deployment.

Provisioned per tenant

Private endpoint

Cloud-provider private connectivity and private DNS expose the qualified service surface without public ingress.

Qualification boundary: Provider service, DNS, routing, identity, operation coverage, and assurance require observed deployment evidence.

Enterprise engagement

On-premises

QNSI control and data services operate inside the customer-managed environment.

Qualification boundary: Compute, storage, custody, update, backup, telemetry, support, and evidence procedures are customer-specific.

Contract-scoped deployment

Air-gapped or sovereign

No steady-state dependency on the public QNSI service is assumed.

Qualification boundary: Offline update, signing, import/export, key custody, recovery, local SIEM, and operator procedures require scope-specific proof.

Open architecture packetReview assurance boundaries

Enterprise evaluation

A diligence path for every technical stakeholder

Each path starts from public evidence and makes the unresolved qualification boundary visible.

Security framework

Threat modelling, policy enforcement, signed audit trails, incident response

Quantum Threat Model v2.0

Comprehensive threat modeling aligned with NIST PQC standards and CRQC timeline assumptions.

  • 6 attacker classes: Opportunistic · Organized Crime · Nation-State (Classical) · Nation-State (Quantum) · HNDL Attacker · Malicious Insider
  • 22 security controls mapped to specific threats
  • HNDL (Harvest Now, Decrypt Later) timeline modeling
  • Data classification: ephemeral → long-lived secrets
  • Legacy migration milestones: staged classical deprecation (PQC-Native is the default)
  • CRQC timeline assumptions tracked per attacker class

Cryptographic Attestation

Forensic-grade cryptographic evidence with NIST algorithm lifecycle tracking and compliance assessment.

  • NIST algorithm registry with lifecycle status (Final / Draft / Deprecated)
  • CBOM (Cryptographic Bill of Materials) export with SHA3-256 content hash
  • Automated CNSA 2.0 and FIPS 140-3 compliance checks
  • Policy enforcement: audit mode or hard-block mode
  • Migration planning for deprecated algorithms (platform-wide)
  • Machine-verifiable compliance snapshots with PQC signatures

Cryptographic Policy Engine

Tenant-configurable PQC enforcement with algorithm allowlists and HSM requirements.

  • KEM: ML-KEM-512/768/1024 (FIPS 203 - formerly Kyber), BIKE, Classic McEliece, FrodoKEM, NTRU, NTRU-Prime
  • Signatures: ML-DSA-44/65/87 (FIPS 204 - formerly Dilithium), SLH-DSA (FIPS 205 - formerly SPHINCS+), FN-DSA (FIPS 206 draft - formerly Falcon), MAYO, CROSS, UOV, SNOVA
  • Symmetric: AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305
  • 87 PQC algorithms across 13 families, 4 policy tiers: Default · Strict · Maximum · Government
  • HSM-enforced root key protection (certification depends on deployment)

Cryptographic Provenance · Pinned Versions

Auditable provenance for every cryptographic primitive - pinned upstream library + language bindings, all versions verifiable against published releases.

  • Upstream library: liboqs v0.15.0 (Open Quantum Safe - released 14 Nov 2025)
  • OpenSSL provider: oqs-provider v0.11.0 (in sync with liboqs v0.15.0)
  • Rust bindings: oqs v0.11.0 + oqs-sys v0.11.0
  • Go bindings: liboqs-go v0.12.0
  • Python bindings: liboqs-python v0.12.0
  • TypeScript native bindings: @heossihq/liboqs-native v0.15.0 (in-house, builds against pinned liboqs 0.15.0)

Cross-Verification · Dual-Provider Crypto

Maximum and Government policy sources can require dual-provider verification; complete runtime coverage across every cryptographic operation remains NOT VERIFIED.

  • 18 algorithms overlap between liboqs (native C) and noble (pure JS) - independent codebases
  • Cross-verification mandatory for maximum + government policy tiers
  • Cross-verification optional for strict tier (signature operations only)
  • liboqs as primary provider, noble as secondary verifier
  • Source-defined provider-attestation record including provider, version, and implementation type; complete operation coverage remains NOT VERIFIED

Provider Attestation in Audit Chain

The provider-attestation contract can record which implementation produced an output; complete operation coverage and audit ingestion remain NOT VERIFIED.

  • ProviderAttestation contract records provider name, version, and implementation type; complete runtime coverage remains NOT VERIFIED
  • Implementation type: native (liboqs) · pure-js (noble) · openssl (oqs-provider)
  • Cross-verification status: verified · single-provider · failed
  • Algorithm + operation type recorded (sign / verify / encap / decap / keygen)
  • Flows into AuditCryptoContext for tamper-evident attestation

Signed Audit Evidence

Cryptographically signed, hash-chained audit trail for compliance and forensics.

  • 59 crypto-critical event types across 12 services
  • PQC-signed events with ML-DSA-65 (Dilithium-3) signatures
  • SHA3-256 event hash chains with SHA3-512 Merkle checkpoints
  • Severity inference: info → critical
  • Receipt-replay verification (independently re-validate any signed receipt)
  • Real-time WebSocket streaming for SIEM ingest (Splunk, Datadog, Slack, GitHub, AWS, Azure, GCP, Okta)

Compliance Frameworks · 48 Controls

Real-time control evaluation against 7 compliance frameworks via live service health probes.

  • SOC 2 Type II (6 controls)
  • HIPAA Security Rule (6 controls)
  • GDPR (5 controls)
  • PCI DSS v4.0.1 (6 controls)
  • ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (6 controls)
  • PDPA Singapore (9 controls) · MAS TRM (10 controls)

Key Compromise Response

Automated 6-step remediation for suspected or confirmed key compromises.

  • Step 1: record_incident - capture incident metadata + correlation ID
  • Step 2: rotate_or_revoke_key - KMS-side action based on severity
  • Step 3: trigger_storage_rewrap - re-encrypt affected stored objects
  • Step 4: invalidate_capability_tokens - revoke active access tokens
  • Step 5: emit_audit_event - append PQC-signed remediation record
  • Step 6: notify_tenant - escalate via configured channels

Downgrade Attack Remediation

Real-time detection and response to cryptographic downgrade attempts.

  • Protocol tracking: PQC-TLS → TLS 1.3 → TLS 1.2
  • Algorithm monitoring: ML-DSA → ECDSA · ML-KEM → ECDH downgrades
  • Automatic IP / user blocking on critical severity
  • Token revocation and resource quarantine
  • Escalation to key compromise handler

Fail-Closed Edge Enforcement

Two-layer entitlement enforcement at the edge gateway before any service proxy. Fail-closed for cryptographic services.

  • Access-status layer: ok · restricted · blocked (402 / 403 responses)
  • Capability layer: per-route allOf / anyOf feature-flag requirements
  • Fail-closed for vault, KMS, enclaves, SSE-X, AI workloads
  • No silent bypass - denies request if billing client unavailable
  • SPIFFE / SVID inter-service mTLS with allowedCallers per service.manifest.json

PQC-TLS Production Canary

Production canary designed to observe PQC-TLS negotiation on selected endpoints. Current proof must come from its live result; deployment alone is not verification.

  • Synthetic ML-KEM handshake against production endpoints on schedule
  • Detects negotiation drops to classical key exchange
  • Alerts on PQC algorithm downgrade in TLS handshake
  • Independent service (apps/pqc-tls-canary) - does not share fate with edge gateway
  • Health probe surfaced via /proxy/canary status

Cryptographic Hot-Reload + Drift Control

Live tenant policy updates without service restart. Continuous validation that environment stays migrated.

  • Three event types: policy_updated · policy_deleted · policy_created
  • Policy changes propagate to KMS, vault, audit, edge gateway in real time
  • Drift-control validation: alerts if classical algorithms reappear post-migration
  • BYOK / BYOH coexistence during cutover (existing customer keys / HSMs)
  • Source-defined migration dry-run, cutover, and reconciliation contracts; complete side effects and audit coverage remain NOT VERIFIED

Migration journey

How customers move trust dependencies into QNSI

QNSI is designed to become the active trust platform your workloads consume, not a passive reporting overlay. The operating path is Connect → Discover → Analyze → Govern → Migrate → Validate → Operate.

1. Connect

Attach cloud/API connectors for managed providers and install QNSI agents for private, self-hosted, or on-prem sources.

2. Discover

Run discovery to normalize keys, secrets, certificates, protocols, providers, and cryptographic dependencies across internal and external estates.

3. Analyze

Measure quantum exposure, policy violations, deprecated algorithms, and the actual cutover blockers preventing migration to QNSI.

4. Govern

Define crypto policy, lifecycle rules, enforce-vs-audit behavior, transition exceptions, and the tenant target state before cutover.

5. Migrate

Move keys, secrets, certificates, and workload trust paths into QNSI so applications call QNSI KMS, Vault, storage, search, and governed services directly.

6. Validate + Operate

Prove cutover with readiness evidence, CBOM, QBOM, SBOM, and continuous monitoring so the environment stays migrated instead of drifting back.

Read migration journeyOpen crypto postureSee PQC benchmarks

Comparing vendors?

Feature-by-feature competitor analysis lives at /competitive-analysis

The master feature matrix (33 features × 4 vendor categories), the three-bucket competitor landscape, and five per-vendor deep-dive pages (Fortanix, SandboxAQ, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault) have moved to a dedicated hub so a buyer in evaluation mode has one destination.

Statement of Direction

Forthcoming platform capabilities.

Capabilities under active development for clients with multi-year cryptographic procurement and architectural requirements. Not generally available. Published forward direction enables long-horizon procurement, architecture, and assurance teams to plan against QNSI's strategic platform programme.

Quantum key distribution (QKD)

Partner integration

Hardware-channel integration paths for BB84 and E91 protocols. Partner engagement with QKD hardware vendors (Toshiba, IDQ, MagiQ) for physical-layer key exchange across metropolitan and inter-data-centre links.

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)

Active development

Computation over encrypted data - analytics, machine-learning inference, and aggregation performed against ciphertexts that never leave their encrypted form. Schemes under evaluation: BFV, BGV, and CKKS via OpenFHE.

PQC-protected federated learning

Active development

Distributed model training with post-quantum-encrypted gradients across organisational boundaries. Designed for financial-sector consortia and healthcare federations where central pooling of sensitive data is constrained by regulation.

Data residency & trust controls (DRTC)

Architecture phase

Sovereign residency enforcement at the platform layer - geographic, legal-jurisdiction, and operator-class controls embedded into every cryptographic operation, with auditable evidence end-to-end.

For clients with these capabilities on a procurement timeline, QNSI supports co-development engagements and early-access partnerships. Contact your account team or open a Free Forever account to begin the conversation.

Where to go next

Quantum-native security across every layer

18 manifest-declared services, hardware-enclave architecture, unified cryptographic policy, and NIST-finalized PQC standards.

Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

The platform questions buyers and AI assistants ask most about algorithms, FIPS posture, deployment, and the quantum threat.

What post-quantum algorithms does QNSI support?

QNSI catalogs 87 PQC algorithms across 13 families - 24 KEMs and 63 signatures. The source defines liboqs as the primary provider and noble as an overlapping cross-verification provider. Complete runtime availability and dual-provider coverage across every operation remain NOT VERIFIED.

Is QNSI FIPS 203, 204, and 205 compliant?

QNSI implements the NIST-finalised standards - FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) - and both providers pass the official NIST ACVP test vectors (noble 435/435, liboqs 240/240 on ML-KEM), published with a SHA-3-256 tamper digest at /verify/conformance. CAVP module validation is in progress.

What is harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL)?

Harvest-now, decrypt-later is an attack where an adversary captures encrypted traffic today and stores it until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer can break it. Long-life data - financial, medical, classified, legal - is exposed the moment it crosses a wire. Applying PQC now keeps captured ciphertext protected past quantum arrival.

What deployment topologies does QNSI support?

QNSI runs as QNSI Cloud today; VPC-peered (AWS, Azure, or GCP), on-premises, air-gapped, and sovereign data-residency topologies are provisioned per tenant on an enterprise engagement. Hardware enclaves include Intel SGX and TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, AWS Nitro, NVIDIA Confidential Computing, ARM TrustZone and CCA, and IBM Secure Execution for confidential AI workloads.

How does QNSI enforce cryptographic policy?

Four crypto-policy tiers - default, strict, maximum, and government - define which algorithms and parameter sets each tenant may use. Enforcement runs in-line at the edge gateway, KMS, and vault. A tier requiring HSM custody fails closed unless a qualified HSM path is active.

Ready to deploy quantum-native security?

Start with the public cloud service or scope an enterprise topology through an architecture and security review. No credit card is required for the free tier.